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.2003; Kenworthy andPontusson 2005; Pontusson 2005, chap.7).C.Policy considerationsThe Chapter shows that countries that have stronger tripartite institutions are betterplaced to ensure that the gains from globalization are distributed in a balanced manner.However, the income distribution effects of tripartite institutions have become weaker.This reflects mainly the inequality-increasing impacts of rapid technological change andglobalization  and the fact that such underlying trends are difficult to arrest directlythrough tripartite institutions.The policy issue is how tripartite institutions can continue to shape income distri-bution, consistent with economic realities.This is an area where country specificities areimportant, so there is no one-size-fits-all model of industrial relations.Yet, policies canpromote the involvement of employers and workers in various ways.First, governments may engage with social partners  and revitalise social dialoguewhere needed  to discuss reforms of labour markets and, particularly, social protection.Experience shows that this may be a helpful way to ensure that the interests of all partiesare well understood.The involvement of social partners in the reform process may alsofacilitate implementation of any agreed measures.And experience shows that strong tri-partite institutions tend to be associated with social protection designed in a way whichprotects workers, and yet is consistent with high employment (see evidence in this Chapter,as well as Chapter 6).Second, in the case of skill development policies, evidence suggests that the involve-ment of social partners is crucial for an efficient design of the measures.This may helpenhance workers skills, and thus achieve better income distribution outcomes.913.Labour institutions and inequalityAppendix AMeasures of labour institutionsInformation on the three labour institutions considered here  trade union density, i.e.thepercentage of wage and salaried workers affiliated to trade unions, collective bargainingstructure more or less centralized or coordinated, and labour law  is drawn largely fromthe database assembled by Jelle Visser for advanced and Central and Eastern Europeancountries.17 This was then supplemented by data from various sources for Latin Americanand Asian countries.18 Table 3.A1 reports the sources of union density data.19Table 3.A1.Sources of trade union density dataFrequence %OECD.Stat 26 3.22Jelle Visser 438 54.21Institute estimates 344 42.57Total 808 100.00For the index of collective bargaining structure, Visser s database  which was comple-mented by our own research for other countries20  provides an index of collective bar-gaining coordination, which in turn updates a previous index elaborated by Kenworthy(2003).This 1-to-5 index is coded as follows:1 = Fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants.2 = Mixed industry- and firm-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-setting and rela-tively weak elements of government coordination, such as setting of basic pay rate orwage indexation.3 = Industry-level bargaining with somewhat irregular and uncertain pattern-setting andonly moderate union concentration.4 = Centralized bargaining by peak confederation(s) OR government imposition of a wageschedule/freeze, without a peace obligation OR informal centralization of industry-and firm-level bargaining by peak associations OR extensive, regularized pattern-set-ting coupled with a high degree of union concentration.17.Many thanks to Jelle Visser for making this database available.18.Initially, data on union density were collected for 139 countries from various sources, but the analysisended up focusing on only 51 countries, those in which there was a meaningful time variation and for whichinformation on other variables was available.For Asian countries, an important source was Kuruvilla et al.(2002).Many thanks to Pascal Annycke and Melissa Luongo for the excellent work they did in assembling someof the data and, in the case of Melissa Luongo, for her research on a number of countries.The data from theVisser database are adjusted density rates: the number of union affiliates who are not wage and salary workersis subtracted from the numerator, and the number of wage and salary workers who do not have the right toorganize (such as public sector workers in some countries) is subtracted by the denominator.For the othercountries, such adjustments were not possible.However, the denominator was kept constant as far as possible.19.The union density variable was linearly interpolated.This increased the number of data points from 719to 808.20.Again, many thanks to Melissa Luongo for providing the information needed for the coding through92 various secondary sources.World of Work Report 2008: Income Inequalities in the Age of Financial Globalization5 = Centralized bargaining by peak confederation(s) OR government imposition of a wageschedule/freeze, with a peace obligation OR informal centralization of industry-levelbargaining by a powerful, monopolistic union confederation.For the non-advanced countries, however, there was often not enough information onthe degree of coordination brought about by institutional features other than the struc-ture of wage-setting [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]