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.In any case, movement of Nicaraguans across theborder was a fact, and the democratic regime faced serious problems in con-trolling it in the light of the numbers involved, the tradition of giving politicalasylum, and Somoza s unpopularity in the country.During the uprising, Costa[186], (9Rica claimed international propriety.For instance, it reported on September15 that nine heavily armed Nicaraguans had been held for questioning at PeñasBlancas.That same day, the Nicaraguan government stated that fourteen San- Lines: 14dinistas had been deported by Costa Rica.But a few attacks were launched from Costa Rica as part of the uprising.Now, as if Nicaragua were the true13.0ptaggressor, on September 12 a frontier incident led Venezuela and Panama to come to the aid of Costa Rica.Planes and helicopters from the two countries Normalwere offered; Venezuela also offered tanks and Panama a company of infantry.PgEnds:The Venezuelan president was reportedly furious.There was no climate inthe oas to intervene in Nicaragua.It was proving difficult even to convene[186], (9a meeting of oas foreign ministers.We learned that he was desperate, accusing the U.S.government for its incapacity to resolve the crisis because itmaintained assistance to Somoza.He threatened to go public in a letter to thepresident of the United States.Apparently the U.S.mission in Caracas calmedhim down.It was also reported that Panamanian strongman Omar Torrijoswanted to invade Nicaragua.93 The Venezuelan, Panamanian, and Costa Ricanrulers met.At 5 a.m.on September 18, I was awakened by a call from Somoza.He saidthat there continued to be attacks from Costa Rica, and he wanted to invokethe U.S.-Nicaragua military assistance agreement in order to have the actionsstopped in the frontier.I told him that I would inform Washington and get backto him.The Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry issued a communiqué interpretingthe events.The statement referred to the aggression as a flagrant violationof the most elementary norms of hemispheric international law and protestedthe Marxist-Leninist-inspired systematic propaganda, which pretended tomake it appear that Nicaragua was the aggressor, when international ter-rorist forces of several nationalities that operate with the complicity of the neutrality 187Costa Rican Government, are the ones that have been criminally assaultingNicaragua with military attacks from its territory. The American diplomatic strategy was twofold: use the Sandinista offensiveand these international complications to obtain in the oas the convening ofthe foreign ministers (this meeting would be kept open so that it couldbe reconvened at any time to deal with the Nicaraguan problem), and usethe good offices of the oas to obtain a cease-fire and peaceful democraticsolution in Nicaragua.On the other side, make bilateral representations to thegovernments involved against Nicaragua to cool it, not engage in militaryactions, and support a mediated solution.By September 19 we were informed that President Carazo was cooperating[Last Page]to reduce tensions.He would not accept foreign troops nor tanks; international[187], (96)support would be welcomed only if required to defend Costa Rica threelarger airplanes that would be interpreted as having offensive purposes hadalready left the country.In principle, Venezuelan aircraft would remain fartherLines: 1417away from Nicaragua in Panama, not Costa Rica. 309.790 Normal PaPgEnds: TE[187], (96) 1234 6.Mediation5678910 To mediate is to reconcile.And reconciliation is the only stable base of peace.11 Pablo Antonio Cuadra,[First Pa12 prologue to Agonía en el Bunker by[188], (113 Miguel Obando y Bravo1415 We already know that when the interests of the U.S.are involved they forgetLines: 016 this principle [of non-intervention].In any case, this would not have needed an 17 armed intervention but a simple warning to the dictator that he could not go0.21pt18 against the whole of his country. 19 Carlos Andrés Pérez, Newsweek, October 9, 1978Normal20PgEnds:2122 The Embassy Organizes the Mediation23 A few hours after the beginning of the final uprising we received instructions[188], (124 to get the opposition to ask for a mediation.On September 11, 1978, I got25 positive responses from Archbishop Obando y Bravo and the economic sector:26 crystallize soonest. 127 My objective was to obtain an invitation without preconditions.However,28 my tactic was a low-key approach to gain as much enthusiastic, unconditional29 support as possible and to have the dissident parties subsequently eliminate30 themselves from the process if they so chose.31 La Prensa s initial reservation sustained the doctrine of self-determination to32 mean both the right of constituting sovereign states independent from foreign33 dictates and the right of having a representative government freely elected; the34 problem was compounded because a supportive clientelistic relationship had35 existed between the United States and the dictatorship.La Prensa stated that36 any mediation which did not assume the necessary retirement of the Somoza37 family from power, in addition to being an intervention in our internal affairs38 would be useless because it would not help solve the conflict. It criticized the39 United States because under the pretext of the principle of nonintervention,40 [it] refuses to clearly break the ropes that tie it to the Somocista dictatorship. mediation 1891 Next to the editorial was an article titled Democratic Organizations, Watch2 Out: A Friendly Initiative That Arouses Suspicions. With the mixture of fan-3 tasy and fact that I had learned to live with, the article opposed a mediation4 because the anonymous author believed it was a U.S.plan to keep Somoza in5 office until 1981 and lead the country to an electoral solution that excluded6 the left.There was, however, ambiguity toward the United States: a pre-19817 solution was necessary because the next elected U.S.president could be an8 ultra-rightist Republican.9 That same day, La Prensa published a communiqué from the fao.It was a10 restatement of the solidarity of all opposition groups, armed and unarmed,11 to establish a government of national unity so that Nicaragua again could12 become a republic.The document recognized the role that the (Sandinista)[189], (2)13 Movimiento del Pueblo Unido also played in the strike called by the fao and14 private sector and was supportive of the Sandinista armed insurrection.2 The15 marriage of convenience between the unarmed and armed opposition wasLines: 52 t16 celebrated in public. 17 I expected that a stumbling block to obtaining the invitation without pre-0.0pt Pg18 conditions would be placed by the Twelve.I had met members of the Twelve 19 even before talking to the president of Nicaragua, but I suppose because ofNormal Pa20 the sensitivity of some of them that the fsln would disapprove of contactsPgEnds: TE21 with an American embassy, the group had been keeping away from me
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