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.Bush still describedthe world at his inauguration as  the familiar bipolar one of superpowerrivalry, if no longer of total confrontation (Bush and Scowcroft 1999: xiii).He did not doubt the efficacy of working with the Israelis against Sovietclients.He thus had no initial reason to lessen strategic cooperation, or toGeorge H.W.Bush, James Baker and Israel 137buck the lobby.However, unlike Ross and Haass, he saw Western access toGulf oil and the sea lanes, not the security of Israel, as the fundamentalregional national interests (Bush 1990: 47 9).The Arab Israeli conflict wasimportant primarily as it affected the East West rivalry.Arabs were seen aseither radical or moderate, based almost entirely upon their relationship tothe Soviet Union (Herrmann 1994: 108 9; Hurst 1999: 30).From service at the UN and CIA and as vice-president, George Bushknew the value of close cooperation with the Mossad and IDF.However, healso knew the concerns, and the strategic value, of moderate Arab leaders,particularly those of the Gulf states.At the United Nations, he had statedthe regret of his government that Israel would not acknowledge its obliga-tions in the Territories under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and that its actions & [were] contrary to the letter and spirit of this convention(Boudreault et al.1992: 126 7).The Seacat subsidiary of his Zapata oilservice company had built the first offshore drilling rig for the Emir ofKuwait (Parmet 1997: 443).He knew Arab leaders well, including KingFahd, President Mubarak and King Hussein.As vice-president he becamequite close to Prince Bandar (Dutton interview).He knew the economics,security requirements and personalities involved in the oil industry andregional politics as no previous president had, which made him imperviousto arguments that Arabs were inherently untrustworthy or bent solely onthe destruction of Israel.AIPAC had other reasons for anxiety about George Bush.He was aleading critic of Israel s incursion into Lebanon (Cannon 1991: 396; Baker1995: 118).Haig had accused him of frustrating the purposes of that incur-sion by assuring the Saudis (and thereby, Arafat) that Israel would not gointo Beirut (Haig 1984: 343).According to Donald Regan s notes of a 1986White House meeting, Bush was concerned that, having facilitated theIranian arms debacle, Israel might try to  squeeze the administration(Hitchens 1992: 62).The question of Bush s involvement in Iran-Contradogged him in the 1988 campaign, and he evidently held Israel partlyresponsible.10 AIPAC s grounds for concern would expand rapidly in the firstyear of Bush s administration.James Baker had no experience with or strong feelings about Israel.Hisinstincts were to see  the Arab Israeli dispute as a pitfall to be avoidedrather than an opportunity to be exploited, and to accept Nixon s advicethat  the Middle East is insoluble.Stay away from it! (Baker 1995:115 16).However, there were vital interests in the region; it was a  perpet-ual tinderbox and the relationship with Israel and  the political power ofthe American Jewish community made it a  perpetual feature of domesticpolitics. To avoid being managed by the issues, he would seek to managethem with  a moderately activist policy in the Middle East, without believ-ing it would significantly change the status quo (ibid.: 116).Thus heaccepted the advice of Ross and Haass to be engaged, but ask little ofIsrael.11 In an early meeting in the Oval Office, Baker took control of Middle138 George H.W.Bush, James Baker and IsraelEast policy, to preserve for Bush the prerogative to intervene when necessary(Dowd and Friedman 1990: 64).Baker sought what would  succeed, meaning a process accepted by allsides rather than a particular result.In an uncharacteristically revealing earlyinterview, he described the guile needed in Texas turkey hunts:The trick is in getting them where you want them, on your terms.Thenyou control the situation, not them & The important thing is knowingthat it s in your hands, that you can do whatever you determine is inyour interest to do.Asked a question on the assumption he was really talking about turkeys,Baker said,  No.I mean Israel. He explained how dialogue with Arafat anddivisions within Israel might be used to create options, by talking to thePLO but not to Shamir s government (Kramer 1989: 27 8) [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]