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.3 Russia is now neither an eternal rival nor auto-matic foe of the West, but  a major outside player, according to DmitriTrenin.4The most significant challenges to President Bush and his successorswill arise in East Asia.From the standpoint of traditional geopolitical cri-teria, this region is replacing Europe as the world s paramount center ofpower.5 This trend will likely continue well into the twenty-first century.The need for a strong American presence is even more compelling in EastAsia than in Europe.Liberal democracy in East Asia is more fragile andless widespread than it is in Europe.East Asia also lacks regional organiza-tions, such as the European Economic Community, capable of promotingeconomic cooperation or ameliorating serious conflicts of interests.It is theworld s fastest growing region not only economically, but also militarily.If winning the war against terror remains the most immediate prior-ity for American foreign policy, then constructively managing the rise ofChina looms as the largest priority for the near future.Geopolitically, theUnited States has a vital interest in preventing any single hostile powerfrom dominating East Asia.A dynamic but still authoritarian China grow-ing at an annual rate of more than 9 percent may develop the capabilityand perhaps already harbor the ambition to attain such dominance.China sultimate path will have a critical effect on world politics.Conclusion 145The range of opinion on how to deal with China spans a more narrowspectrum than most fundamental debates over American foreign policy.Consensus exists on the need to retain a strong American presence in EastAsia.Unlike Western Europe, where the zone of democratic peace was but-tressed by strong regional institutions, East Asia remains a highly com-petitive, fractious, and ideologically diverse region.Nor are there adequateregional substitutes for American power to forge an effective balancingcoalition should China embark on an expansionist course.Even the com-bination of India and Japan could not suffice, in its own right, to containChinese power.Consensus also exists that trade with China is largely desirable.Eventhose most wary of Chinese ambitions distinguish between the effects ofengagement with China and the failed policy of détente with the SovietUnion, which rested on many of the same premises but operated in lessfelicitous circumstances.Engagement with the Soviet Union failed becauseit was a totalitarian state with no private sector.In these circumstances,Western trade and credits subsidized the very Soviet military apparatus somenacing to the United States and ameliorated the pressure for fundamen-tal political reform.Conversely, trade with China could have a more be-nign result by strengthening and emboldening China s burgeoning privatesector.Eventually, China s entrepreneurial middle class may demand com-mensurate political rights, which could lead to regime change that wouldtame Chinese ambitions.Consensus exists, too, that a high level of trade with China is now anecessity as well as a virtue.China s membership in the World Trade Or-ganization (WTO) has deprived the United States of significant leverage tolink trade to other aspects of Chinese foreign policy, whether we like it ornot.Instead, American statesmen should concentrate their efforts on themore limited but significant goal of constraining the sale of those technolo-gies that could dangerously magnify the threat the Chinese military posesto American vital interests in East Asia.Even here, the United States willencounter resistance from the EU and its own business community.The most vigorous debate on China revolves around two questions:how much deterring does China prudently require? What configurationshould such deterrence prudently take? There are two alternative strategiesfor addressing these fundamental questions, with hybrids in between.Pro-ponents of engagement believe that China has become a status quo power146 In Defense of the Bush Doctrineseeking peace, security, and prosperity, and not hegemony.By fosteringtrade with China and immersing it in the international system, they furtherbelieve that the United States can foster a durable equilibrium in East Asiathat is consistent with the national interests of both countries.6 Liberal pro-ponents of engagement such as President Clinton and realist proponentssuch as Henry Kissinger disagree about whether the internal characteris-tics of the Chinese regime affect its external goals and behavior.Unlike therealists, the liberals accept that a more open, democratic China would be amore benign China to its citizens and its neighbors, which they assume isjust what engagement will facilitate [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]